International Journal of Aviation,
Aeronautics, and Aerospace
Volume 3

Issue 1

Article 4

2-19-2016

Pilot Perceptions on Impact of Crew Rest Regulations on Safety
and Fatigue
Lukas Rudari
Purdue University, lrudari@purdue.edu

Mary E. Johnson
Purdue University, mejohnson@purdue.edu

Robert C. Geske
Purdue University, robert.geske@aopa.org

Lauren A. Sperlak
Purdue University, LSperlak@purdue.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa
Part of the Air and Space Law Commons, Aviation Safety and Security Commons, Health Law and
Policy Commons, Human Resources Management Commons, and the Transportation Commons

Scholarly Commons Citation
Rudari, L., Johnson, M. E., Geske, R. C., & Sperlak, L. A. (2016). Pilot Perceptions on Impact of Crew Rest
Regulations on Safety and Fatigue. International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, 3(1).
https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2016.1096

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace by an authorized
administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu.

Rudari et al.: Pilot Perceptions on Impact of Crew Rest Regulations

In June 2008, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued a
recommendation urging the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) to “develop
guidance, based on empirical and scientific evidence, for operators to establish
fatigue management systems, including information about the content and
implementation of these systems” (National Transportation Safety Board, 2008, p.
10). The NTSB stated that it took this step based on “longstanding concerns about
human fatigue causing or contributing to aviation accidents and/or incidents”
(NTSB, 2008, p. 3) and the inadequacy of existing regulation at mitigating fatigue
risks in aviation.
The Air Line Pilots Association [ALPA] (2008a), a large U.S. and Canadian
pilot union, commended NTSB for its work in the area of airline pilot fatigue,
signaling that unions are concerned that pilot fatigue poses a risk to safety in
aviation. The organization highlighted that any solution to combat pilot fatigue
would have to be successfully included in corporate cultures and corporate fatigue
risk management systems (Air Line Pilots Association, 2008a).
The safety risk of pilot fatigue became more apparent after two recent major
aviation accidents. Colgan Air flight 3407 crashed on February 12, 2009, about
2217 Eastern Standard Time (EST). While the NTSB did not identify fatigue as a
contributing factor to the accident, recommendations were made in the final
accident report to improve the fatigue risk management system (FRMS) in place at
Colgan Air (NTSB, 2010). UPS flight 1354 crashed on August 14, 2013, about
0447 Central Daylight Time (CDT). NTSB (2014) found that both the captain’s and
first-officer's flight performance was impaired due to fatigue and circadian factors.
In 2012, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) made changes to the
previous rest requirements in the form of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part
117 (Part 117) for passenger operations to address fatigue-related risks factors for
airline pilots. The rule became effective as of January 2014 (“Flightcrew Member
Duty,” 2012). The rest requirements found in Part 117 are applicable to all
certificate holders operating under 14 CFR Part 121 (Part 121), which includes most
passenger airline pilots in the United States. As of January 2015, cargo carrier
carriers operating under Part 121 are exempt from Part 117.
Problem Statement
This study explores the perceptions of self-identified FAA-certified pilots
on effects of Part 117 on safety, alertness and fatigue three months after the rule
became effective. It is widely accepted that shared beliefs and perceptions are
linked to safety culture (Cooper, 2000). The researchers regard pilot perceptions of
Part 117 and its elements as an important indication of the adequacy and success of
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the crew rest requirements. Using a Likert-scale survey, self-identified pilots
certified by the FAA were asked about the perceived impact of the crew rest
requirements on overall safety, including the ability to operate the aircraft safely
and adapt to an adequate sleep cycle, as well as alertness and fatigue level.
The researchers decided to include a question to determine whether pilots
were in favor of including cargo pilots in Part 117 specifically to establish how the
pilot community perceived this exclusion. This question was included in response
to a press release by the union representing UPS pilots calling for an end of the Part
117 exception for cargo carriers (Independent Pilots Association, 2014).
Literature Review
The purpose of this literature review was to define fatigue and its impact on
safety in aviation, discuss the development and scope of the crew rest regulations,
and provide an overview of prior studies on pilot fatigue perception in aviation.
Defining Fatigue and its Impact on Safety in Aviation
Most people have experienced fatigue in their lives at home, work, or
school. Fatigue may generally be defined as a reduction in the ability to complete
work, and may occur due to physically or mentally demanding tasks.
Caldwell (2005) stated that commercial airline pilots are “constantly
confronted with long duty days, early departures, late arrival, and non-standard
work hours that include night duty and rotating schedules” (p. 88) and found that
these factors could result in sleep loss, which may contribute to fatigue. Pilot fatigue
is a well-recognized concern in the airline industry. The European Cockpit
Association (2012) reported that 85% of pilots surveyed in Austria and Denmark
indicated operating aircraft while being too fatigued. A survey of Portuguese airline
pilots found that 91.4% of participants revealed having made errors in the cockpit
due to fatigue (Reis, Mestre, & Canhão, 2013).
There are many definitions of fatigue. In the context of aviation, the
International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO] (2013) defines fatigue as:
A physiological state of reduced mental or physical performance capability
resulting from sleep loss or extended wakefulness, circadian phase, or
workload (mental and/or physical activity) that can impair a crew member’s
alertness and ability to safely operate an aircraft or perform safety-related
duties (p. 2).
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ICAO’s definition of fatigue emphasized important factors that affect a
pilot’s ability to safely operate an aircraft, such as extended wakefulness, workload,
and circadian phases. The FAA (2009) described fatigue and its impact on safety
as “a condition characterized by increased discomfort with lessened capacity for
work, reduced efficiency of accomplishment, loss of power or capacity to respond
to stimulation, and is usually accompanied by a feeling of weariness and tiredness”
(p. 2). Increased discomfort is a perception or feeling. Therefore, perception of
fatigue is part of measuring fatigue.
There is no universal answer to how fatigue can be avoided, but Konz
(1990) suggested that “Fatigue is reduced by (1) preventing it in the first place, and
(2) curing it with rest,” (p. 293) two principles that are evident in the Part 117 crew
rest requirements.
Pilot associations in Europe and North America (European Cockpit
Association, 2012) have identified pilot fatigue as a major safety issue for their
members. ALPA (2008a) has long worked on lobbying and advocating for
improved crew rest requirements to mitigate the impact of fatigue on pilot
performance. In 2008, ALPA stated that “The flight and duty rules and regulation
in the United States and Canada are archaic, were written decades ago and were
based on aircraft types and operations that were in existence then.” (p. iii), urging
regulators to act.
Previous Studies on Pilot Fatigue Perception in Aviation
Co, Gregory, Johnson and Rosekind (1999) found that regional airline pilots
identified long duty days, multiple flight legs, and short rest periods as factors
contributing to fatigue. Bourgeois-Bourgrine, Cabon, Gounelle, Mollard and
Coblentz (2003) found in a survey of 739 airline pilots that both long-haul and
short-haul pilots perceived sleep loss as principal factor for fatigue.
Development and Scope of Crew Rest Regulations
Managing human fatigue has been an item on NTSB’s “Most Wanted” list
since its first publication in 1990 (U.S. Department of Transportation [DOT],
2009). In June 2008, the NTSB issued a recommendation urging the FAA to
“develop guidance…for operators to establish fatigue management systems” (p.
10).
In 2009, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) announced an audit of FAA
regulations and airline policies in regard to crew rest requirements (DOT, 2009). In
2010, Congress passed the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration
Extension Act of 2010, which is also known as the 1,500-hour rule. The act
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contained provisions about pilot fatigue in Section 212. In this section, Congress
urged the FAA to “issue regulations . . . to specify limitation on the hours of flight
and duty time” (p. 2362) considering factors such as time of day, number of takeoffs
and landings, number of time zones crossed as well as research on fatigue (Airline
Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010). The act also
contained provisions requiring Part 121 carriers to submit Fatigue Risk
Management Plans to the FAA.
The FAA accelerated its work on crew rest requirements and issued a notice
for proposed rulemaking in 2010 (FAA, 2010). The final rule was published in the
Federal Register on January 4, 2012. It became effective two years later on January
4, 2014 (“Flightcrew Member Duty,” 2012).
Part 117 consists of thirteen sections related to crew rest that are shown in
Table 1. The elements of the regulations included fitness for duty requirements, the
introduction of required Fatigue Risk Management Systems (FRMS) for airlines,
flight time limitations, the introduction of flight duty periods, cumulative flight
time and flight duty period limits, and required rest periods (“Flightcrew Member
Duty,” 2012). The following section explains six major sections contained in Part
117.
Fitness for Duty. The fitness for duty requirements introduced in Part 117 instruct
individual flight crew members to affirm that they are prepared and rested enough
to perform their duty (“Flightcrew Member Duty,” 2012).
Fatigue Risk Management System. The definition of a FRMS is “the planning
and control of the working environment, in order to minimize, as far as is
reasonably practicable, the adverse effects of fatigue on workforce alertness and
performance” (Gander et al., 2011, p. 574). Gander et al. (2011) also determined
that comprehensive FRMS include both fatigue prevention and fatigue mitigation
strategies. Under Part 117, airlines need to establish a FRMS to better manage
fatigue-related risk factors (“Flightcrew Member Duty,” 2012).
Flight Time Limitations. In Part 117, the FAA defined limits for maximum flight
time. For 2-pilot crews, a pilot cannot be scheduled to fly more than 8 hours
between midnight to 5am, 9 hours between 5 am and 7:59 pm, and 8 hours between
8 pm and midnight. Flight time limits of 13 hours and 17 hours apply for 3-pilot
and 4-pilot crews respectively (“Flightcrew Member Duty,” 2012).
Flight Duty Periods. The FAA defined limits for flight duty period durations
ranging between 9 and 14 hours based on time of start and number of flight
segments flown (“Flightcrew Member Duty,” 2012).
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Table 1
Elements of Part 117 Contained in the Federal Register
Section

Description

§ 117.5 Fitness for duty

Flightcrew members need to affirmatively state that he or she is fit for duty, defined as rested
and prepared to perform his or her duties

§ 117.7 Fatigue risk management system

Airlines must have a FRMS or equivalent system in place, which must include pre-defined
components

§ 117.7 Fatigue education and awareness
training program

Airlines must develop and implement a fatigue education and awareness training program for
crewmembers, crew schedulers, operations managers and personnel overseeing operations or
scheduling

§ 117.11 Flight time limitation

The FAA specified time limits for flight duty periods, depending on number of flightcrew
members present in the cockpit, time of report and number of segments

§ 117.13 — Flight duty period:
Unaugmented operations

In addition to flight duty period limitations, the FAA introduced the term “unaugmented
operations”, under which the flight duty period is based on local time at the theater in which the
flightcrew member was last acclimated. The maximum flight duty period is reduced by 30
minutes for unaugmented operations.

§ 117.15 Flight duty period: Split duty

Under certain conditions and for unaugmented operations only, if a flightcrew member is
provided with a rest opportunity (an opportunity to sleep) in a suitable accommodation during
his or her flight duty period, the time that the flightcrew member spends in the suitable
accommodation is not part of that flightcrew member's flight duty period

§ 117.17 Flight duty period: Augmented
flightcrew

For flight operations conducted with an acclimated augmented flightcrew, no certificate holder
may assign and no flightcrew member may accept an assignment if the scheduled flight duty
period will exceed specified limits

§ 117.19 Flight duty period extension

Under unforeseen operational circumstances, flight duty period extensions of up to 2 hours may
apply

§ 117.21 Reserve status

The FAA defined time limits for flightcrew member reserve status

§ 117.23 Cumulative limitation

Flightcrew member's total flight time cannot exceed: (1) 100 hours in any 672 consecutive
hours or (2) 1,000 hours in any 365 consecutive calendar day period. Flightcrew member's total
Flight Duty Period cannot exceed: (1) 60 flight duty period hours in any 168 consecutive hours
or (2) 190 flight duty period hours in any 672 consecutive hours.

§ 117.25 Rest period

Before beginning any reserve or duty period a flightcrew member must be given at least 30
consecutive hours free from all duty within the past 168 consecutive hour period. If the
flightcrew member travels more than 60 degrees longitude or is away for more than 158
consecutive hours, a rest period of 56 hours or three physiological nights’ rest must be provided.
Flightcrew members rest time can be reduced to 10 hours with 8 hours of uninterrupted sleep
opportunity if travel is within 60 degrees of longitude and cumulative limitations are not
exceeded.

§ 117.27 Consecutive nighttime operations A certificate holder may schedule and a flightcrew member may accept up to five consecutive
flight duty periods that infringe on the window of circadian low if the certificate holder provides
the flightcrew member with an opportunity to rest in a suitable accommodation during each of
the consecutive nighttime flight duty periods.
§ 117.29 Emergency and government
sponsored operations

Special regulations exist for emergency and government sponsored operations

Note. From “Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements” 77 Fed. Reg. 329
(January 4, 2012) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 117, 119, 121)
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Cumulative Flight Time and Flight Duty Period Limits. No pilot is permitted to
fly more than 100 hours in any 627 consecutive hour period or 1,000 hours in any
consecutive 365 calendar day period. Additionally, the total cumulative flight duty
period cannot exceed 60 hours in any 168 consecutive hour time period or 190 flight
duty hours in any 672 consecutive hour period (“Flightcrew Member Duty,” 2012).
Required Rest Periods. Pilots must have a rest period of at least 30 consecutive
hours within the past 168 consecutive hour period. Part 117 also contains provisions
for travel exceeding 60 degrees of longitude, in which case an extended 56-hour
rest period “encompassing three physiological nights’ rest” must be provided. If no
travel exceeding 60 degrees of longitude takes place, a rest period of 10 hours
including 8 hours of uninterrupted sleep opportunity must be provided prior to any
duty period (“Flightcrew Member Duty,” 2012).
Method
An online survey was sent to subscribers of the Flight Safety Information
Newsletter, maintained by Curt Lewis and Associates LLC. This newsletter was
selected primarily due to its large number of subscribers who are pilots. Over a
period of three weeks in March and April 2014, 132 self-identified pilots
participated in the study. For the analysis, 92 respondents completed all survey
questions and, therefore, were selected to be included in the study.
Of these 92 pilots, 88 identified as male and 4 as female. When asked about
their highest level of pilot certification, 89 respondents indicated having a FAA Air
Transport Pilot Certificate; one participant indicated having a FAA Commercial
certificate; and two participants chose “Other.” For type of operations flown, 68%
of participants indicated that they fly under Part 121 Passenger Service, 17% under
Part 91, 12% under Part 121 Cargo Service, and 3% under Part 135, as shown in
Figure 1.
Prior to the main survey questions, participants were asked to rate their
knowledge of the changes contained in Part 117 ranging from “I have not heard
about it” to “I have heard about it and I am very familiar with it.” Five participants
who chose “I have not heard about it” were directed to the end of the survey and
thanked for their participation.
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Figure 1. Type of operations flown by survey participants
Table 2 shows the questions contained in the survey. The first question
contained five sub-items. Participants were asked to choose answers on a scale
ranging from 1 – strongly negative to 5 – strongly positive. The second question
asked participants if they thought that cargo operations should be included in the
crew rest regulations. Participants were asked to choose answers on a scale ranging
from 1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree. The third question asked for
comments on the crew rest regulations.
Table 2
Representation of Survey Structure and Survey Questions
#
1

Question
Please indicate how you feel
the following items have been
impacted on a personal level by
the new regulations in 14
C.F.R. Part 117

Item
Overall Safety
Ability for pilots to operate the aircraft
safely

Type of Answer
Likert-scale:
1 – strongly negative to
5 – strongly positive

Overall pilot alertness
Ability for pilots to adapt to an adequate
sleep cycle
Overall pilot fatigue level

2

Do you think that Cargo
Operations should be included
in 14 C.F.R Part 117?

Likert-scale:
1 – strongly disagree to
5 – strongly agree

3

Do you have any additional
comments regarding how the
new regulations in 14 C.F.R.
Part 117 will affect you
personally?

Open-ended
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The survey questions were developed by the researchers, then revised with
the help of an expert panel to assure face validity. The expert panel consisted of
three university aviation professors who have Part 121 flight experience as well as
extensive knowledge of both survey creation and survey methodology.
The 13 Likert-scale questions contained in sections one through three were
analyzed for internal consistency with Cronbach’s α, which resulted in a value of α
= 0.901. A Cronbach’s α of ≥ 0.6 is generally accepted to be robust. For the analysis
of the 49 open-ended comments, the researchers developed a coding scheme to
identify recurring themes. The coding process was independently performed by two
researchers using QSR International’s NVivo 10 qualitative data analysis software.
Table 3 shows the ten different codes that were assigned to the open-ended answers.
The coding results were compared and the agreement rate between the two raters
was 94%, as provided by the qualitative data analysis software.
Table 3
Codes and Definitions Used in Qualitative Analysis of Open-Ended Comments
Code
Cargo
Improve safety
Less fatigued
Less rest
Less safe
Longer flight time
More fatigued
Negative
Positive
Split day

Description
Participant mentioned cargo in comment
Participant mentioned improved safety
Participant mentioned being less fatigued
Participant mentioned getting less rest
Participant mentioned being less safe
Participant mentioned having to fly more
Participant mentioned feeling more fatigued
Participant mentioned feeling negatively about the new regulations
Participant mentioned feeling positively about the new regulations
Participant mentioned the problem of split day and split shift

Results
Results from each of the three survey questions are discussed. Once again,
it is important to mention that the rule became effective in January 2014 and that
the survey was administered in March and April 2014.
Perceptions of the Regulations Impact
The five sub-question in this section were used to measure perceptions of the impact
Part 117 had on ability to operate the aircraft safely, alertness, ability to adapt to an
adequate sleep cycle and fatigue level. Table 4 summarizes the results.
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Pilots perceived that Part 117 impacted safety positively, with 32 (35%)
respondents choosing “Slightly Positive” and 8 (9%) respondents choosing
“Strongly Positive.” Sixteen (17%) felt a “Slightly Negative” impact and 11 (12%)
felt a “Strongly Negative” impact on overall safety at a personal level. Twenty-five
(27%) of respondents felt no impact on overall safety at a personal level.
Pilots indicated positive perceptions of the impact on overall level of
fatigue. Twenty-nine (32%) participants felt a slightly positive impact of Part 117
on their overall fatigue level and three (3%) participants felt a strongly positive
impact. Sixteen (17%) participants indicated a slight negative impact on their
fatigue level and 13 (14%) indicated a strongly negative impact. Thirty-one (33%)
participants felt no impact of Part 117 on their overall fatigue level.
Overall, pilot perceptions on these five items were mixed, with many pilots
indicating that they perceived no positive or negative impact.
Table 4
Perceptions of the Regulations’ Impact on Personal Level
Question

Strongly
Negative
12%

Slightly
Negative
17%

None

Strongly
Positive
9%

Mean

SD

27%

Slightly
Positive
35%

3.11

1.162

Ability to operate
the aircraft safely

4%

22%

35%

30%

9%

3.17

1.012

Overall pilot
alertness

8%

21%

38%

29%

4%

3.02

0.994

Ability to adapt to
an adequate sleep
cycle

12%

15%

47%

23%

3%

2.90

0.995

Overall pilot
fatigue level

14%

17%

34%

32%

3%

2.92

1.092

Overall safety

Perceptions on Inclusion of Cargo Operators
Fifty-seven (62%) participants strongly agreed and 16 (17%) agreed with
the statement that cargo operators should be included under Part 117, compared to
seven participants (8%) disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the statement.
Eleven (12%) participants neither agreed or disagreed with the statement. Figure 2
summarizes the results.
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Figure 2. Frequency of responses to inclusion of cargo carriers.
Only 12% of the respondents identified themselves as cargo pilots, while a
total 79% of the pilots agreed that cargo carriers should be included in Part 117. Of
the twelve cargo pilots answering the survey, nine strongly agreed and one agreed
about including cargo pilots in Part 117. One cargo pilot strongly disagreed and one
cargo pilot answered “neither agree or disagree.”
Open-Ended Survey Responses
Forty-nine (53%) of the 92 participants used the opportunity to provide
comments about the impact of the regulations on a personal level. The researchers
analyzed these responses by assigning ten different codes to the comments based
on topics mentioned. The frequency of each code is shown in Figure 3. As
mentioned earlier, the coding agreement rate was 94%, which is considered high.
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Time
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Less
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Figure 3. Frequency of codes in comments.
For the qualitative analysis, common themes were identified. The results
revealed that generally negative perceptions about the crew rest regulations were
mentioned eighteen times, and generally positive perceptions nine times. Specific
comments, both positive and negative, are presented separately under headings
such as “improve safety” and “longer flight time.” For safety, eight respondents
indicated “less safe” and three respondents indicated “improve safety.” For fatigue,
11 respondents indicated “more fatigue,” and one respondent indicated “less
fatigue.”
These comments lead to a general impression that the crew rest changes are
more often viewed negatively than positively among the pilots providing
comments. It is important to note that specific negative or positive comments such
as “more fatigued” or “improve safety” are not a subset of general negative or
positive comments. Individual comments may have had multiple codes assigned.
Discussion
Perception of self-identified FAA-certified pilots on effects of Part 117 on
safety, alertness and fatigue was addressed in the first survey question. The results
of this first survey question showed that pilots perceived a mixed impact of Part
117 on safety, alertness and fatigue, with between 27%-47% of pilots picking a
neutral position. The researchers believe that this high percentage of neutral
responses may be attributed to the timing of the survey, which was sent out over a
two-week period in March/April 2014, only months after the rule became effective
in January 2014.
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Pilot perceptions on including cargo carriers in the Part 117 regulations
were asked in the second survey question. The results for this second question
showed that pilots strongly favor an inclusion of cargo carriers under Part 117,
indicating that the surveyed pilots had strong opinions about the exclusion of cargo
pilots.
The third research question gave participating pilots the opportunity to
provide open-ended comments. Eighteen out of 49 open-ended comments indicated
negative reactions to the crew rest requirements, while positive sentiments were
mentioned nine times. Selected negative comments are discussed in order to
highlight some of the perceived shortcomings of Part 117.
Fourteen respondents mentioned that they were now flying more hours
under Part 117. One pilot stated that “While this [the crew rest regulations] was
done to combat fatigue, I feel like it has done the opposite in many ways. I can now
fly up to nine block hours versus eight, depending upon check in time and number
of legs. I can also routinely fly six days in a row, and I never could do that under
the previous rules. The cumulative aspects of fatigue are dangerous, but they are
overlooked completely.”
Four participants mentioned the problem of split days or split shifts.
Although the crew rest requirements prescribe a 10-hour rest period, including 8
hours of uninterrupted sleep opportunity between two separate flight duty periods,
the rest time can be scheduled during any time of day or night (“Flightcrew Member
Duty,” 2012). Pilots mentioned that scheduling a rest period during day-time did
not afford them with an adequate rest opportunity between two shifts. In a split shift
day, pilots may be scheduled to fly two long-haul flights within a 24-hour period.
To illustrate this split-shift scenario, a hypothetical example was developed and is
shown in Figure 4.
The rest period between two separate flight duty periods can be reduced to
10 hours with 8 hours of uninterrupted sleep opportunity if travel does not exceed
60° of longitude, a reduction from 56 hours or three nights when travel exceeds 60°
of longitude. In the scenario shown in Figure 4, a pilot is scheduled to fly from the
East Coast of the U.S. to Brazil for the first flight duty period. After completing the
first duty period, an airline could hypothetically schedule the same pilot for a trip
to Europe on the same day of his return, after only 10 hours of rest time that would
occur during daytime. In this scenario, the split between shifts occurs on day 5 –
the Split Day.
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Figure 4. A hypothetical split-shift scenario
The opinion that cargo operators should be included in the regulations was
another recurring theme, explicitly mentioned by four pilots in the open-ended
comments section. One pilot stated that “When cargo operators were cut out of the
117 rules, the industry failed to protect the pilots and public on the ground. To not
be covered by the new 117 rules is a slap in the face and to say my life has no
value.”
A second pilot stated that “a hull loss [of a cargo aircraft] into a
school/freeway (you name it) would be equally disastrous as a passenger aircraft.”
The analysis of the open-ended comments revealed negative perceptions
among pilots about the lack of cargo carrier inclusion in the rest requirements and
the problem of split shifts, where pilots were scheduled to operate two long-haul
flights within a 24-hour period.
Limitations
A caveat of the findings is that the survey was conducted less than four
months after the effective date of Part 117. It is possible that pilots and airlines had
not completed their adjustments to accommodate the rule in an operationally
feasible manner at that point in time. The survey may need to be repeated to
measure pilot perceptions longitudinally to better understand the effect of Part 117
on perceived safety and level of fatigue.
It should also be noted that a response bias may be present as the results of
this survey may not be representative of the general pilot population. In addition, a
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known response bias for this of type of survey is that participants with strong
opinions may be overrepresented, especially in the open-ended comments.

Conclusion
This study explored the perceptions of self-identified FAA-certified pilots
on effects of Part 117 on safety, alertness and fatigue within months after the rule
became effective. Pilots were asked about their perception of including cargo pilots
under Part 117.
Pilot perceptions were mixed on the safety, fatigue and alertness items.
Responses for many items were slightly positive, but a large percentage of
respondents were neutral, which the researchers contribute to the relative recent
effectiveness of Part 117 at the time of survey administration in March/April 2014.
Seventy-nine percent of pilots responded that they were very strongly or
strongly in favor of including cargo pilots under Part 117. This apparent concern
about the exclusion of cargo carriers in the crew rest regulations was also reflected
in the open comments, where four pilots explicitly mentioned the issue.
This exploratory study into perceptions of self-identified pilots shortly after
the implementation of these crew rest requirements can serve as a stepping stone
for future research. Follow-up studies in years after the implementation of Part 117
and an increased sample size may help to measure pilot perceptions longitudinally.
It is also hoped that the open-ended comments presented in this study can help
researchers to develop further research questions based on the issues mentioned by
pilots.
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